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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN V. SUMMERS, | 
Petitioner/Appellant, i 
vWl « 
GERALD COOK, Warden, State i 
Prison, i 
Respondent/Respondent.i 
t Case No. 870070-CA 
i Priority 10 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) in the Third 
District Court. This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner filed a document entitled Motion for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and styled Utah County v. Steven V. Summers, in the 
Fourth District Court in early October, 1985. On October 11, 
1985, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen ordered the case transferred to 
the Third District Court. The document was not filed in the 
Third District Court until April 9, 1986 (R. 2). Petitioner 
filed a second "Motion" in Fourth District Court on November 4, 
1985, and Judge Christensen again ordered the case transferred to 
the Third District Court on November 6, 1985. This document was 
not stamped with the date of receipt by the Third District Court 
(R. 16-18). 
On April 22, 1986, petitioner filed a Hotion for 
Default Judgment in the Third District Court (R. 12-15). Judge 
J. Dennis Frederick heard the motion on April 28, 1986, denied it 
on the grounds that the "motion" for a writ of habeas corpus 
contained no allegations, and granted petitioner 14 days to file 
an amended complaint stating precisely his allegations of illegal 
restraint under the new caption Steven V. Summers v. Gerald Cook, 
Wardent Ptah State Prison (R. 19-21)• A final order denying 
default judgment was signed on May 2, 1986 (R. 20-21)* (On July 
23, 1986, petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal from 
Judge Frederick's denial of his motion for a default judgment (R. 
50)). 
Thereatter, petitioner's counsel sought and was granted 
an extension to June 21, 1986 to file the amended complaint (R. 
29). On Hay 27, 1986 petitioner sought an order appointing 
alternate counsel because he was displeased with Mr. Jones' 
performance (R. 24-26). On June 17, 1986, Mr. Jones filed an 
amended complaint (R. 30-32). 
Petitioner filed a second amended complaint on July 16, 
1986 (R. 36-47). On July 30, 1986, the Attorney General filed an 
answer to petitioner's complaint (R. 52-53). On August 7# 1986, 
petitioner filed a second motion for a default judgment (R. 84-
85). On August 5, 1986, petitioner's Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal was filed in the Utah Supreme Court on Judge Frederick's 
denial of the first motion for a default judgment (R. 70-74). On 
August 4, 1986, petitioner moved for a stay of the district court 
proceedings on his amended complaint and second Motion for 
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Default Judgment pending the outcome of his Interlocutory Appeal 
in the Supreme Court (R. 54, 62). 
On August 18, 1986, Judge Frederick denied the second 
motion for a default judgment but stayed the remainder of the 
proceedings pending a ruling in the Interlocutory Appeal (R. 93, 
95-96). On August 26, 1986 the Utah Supreme Court denied the 
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (see Addendum). 
In September, 1986, petitioner filed a second Petition 
for an Interlocutory Appeal from Judge Frederick's denial of the 
second motion for a default judgment. The petition was denied by 
the Utah Supreme Court on September 29, 1986 (see Addendum). 
On October 27, 1986 respondent moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint in Third District Court on the grounds that 
petitioner also had pending a direct appeal in the criminal case 
upon which he based his petition for post conviction relief. 
Petitioner next filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus requesting 
the Utah Supreme Court to compel Judge Frederick to enter a 
default judgment in petitioner's favor. The Supreme Court denied 
mandamus relief (R. 161)• 
On December 8, 1986, Judge Frederick dismissed the 
Amended Complaint on the grounds that petitioner also had pending 
a direct appeal from the same judgment (R. 171-172). Petitioner 
objected to the ruling alleging that he had insufficient time to 
respond to the memorandum filed by the respondent and Judge 
Frederick reconsidered the motion in light of petitioner's 
objection and responsive memorandum. Judge Frederick then, by 
minute entry dated November 24, 1986, again granted respondent's 
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motion to dismiss (R. 173)• Petitioner now appeals from the 
order dismissing his petition (R. 177). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Frederick correctly dismissed the petition 
because petitioner could have appealed the issues he raised and a 
post-conviction writ is not a substitute for a direct appeal. 
This is true even though the Judge did not hear evidence on the 
merits of petitioner's claims since the Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide for dismissed of cases in appropriate circumstances. If 
this court determines that the case was erroneously dismissed, it 
should remand to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing, 
as provided in Utah R. Ct. App. 20(a) (1987). 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court already determined that 
Judge Frederick correctly denied petitioner's two motions for 
default judgments. Moreover, default judgments are inappropriate 
in post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POIMT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SEEKING POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Judge Frederick granted respondent's motion to dismiss 
because petitioner had pending a direct appeal from the judgment 
he challenged in these proceedings and because a petition for 
post-conviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for a 
direct appeal. &Z2. Andrews v. Morris. 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983)i 
Codianna v- Morris. 660 P#2d 1101 (Utah 1983). On this appeal, 
petitioner argues that Judge Frederick's ruling was erroneous in 
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an argument made up of a series of case quotations that is not 
altogether clear. However, it appears that petitioner contends 
that habeas corpus may be used in conjunction with or as an 
alternative to a direct appeal. 
Regardless of the authorities cited by petitioner, 
StAe v. Kelsey. 64 Utah 377f 231 P. 122 (1924) f1 WJnnPVJCh V, 
BmfilXf 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908) i2 and Ramipell v. Smith. 560 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)
 f
3
 the Utah Supreme Court held in Andrews 
and Codianna that post-conviction habeas corpus relief is not a 
substitute for a direct appeal. The issue here is whether, under 
the circumstances of this case, Judge Frederick properly applied 
the Andrews and Coalanna rulings to petitioner. 
At the time Judge Frederick dismissed petitioner's 
complaint, there was pending before the Utah Supreme Court a 
direct appeal from a denied ot a motion for credit for time 
served in petitioner's criminal case. Thus, the Supreme Court 
bad jurisdiction over the case at the time. 
Second, petitioner could have appealed from his guilty 
plea, ££& State v. Moreno. 655 P.2d 23 (Ariz. App. 1982); ££&££ 
1
 Kelsey does not stand for the proposition for which petitioner 
cites it. Kelsey was a pre-conviction writ and the appeal from 
an order granting the writ was dismissed because it was filed by 
the State of Utah which was not a party to the lower court 
proceeding. 
2
 Wlnnovich also does not support petitionees claim and, in 
fact, supports respondent's position. See 33 Utah at 359 (habeas 
corpus cannot serve purpose of appeal)• 
Rammeii supports the respondent's position that habeas corpus 
is not a substitute for appeal. Petitioner herein does not fit 
any of the circumstances listed by the court as reviewable in a 
habeas corpus proceeding. JSae. 560 P.2d at 1109. 
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v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978), and from the denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, State v. Gibbons. 60 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah July 30, 1987), but be did not. Andrews and 
Codianna clearly preclude petitioner from raising in writ 
proceedings issues which could have been raised on direct appeal. 
For this reason. Judge Frederick's ruling was correct. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS 
PETITION COULD HOT BE DISMISSED 
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
THE MERITS IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(6) provides that the Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply to pleadings filed in a post-conviction 
proceeding. Rule 12 allows for motions to dismiss under certain 
circumstances. Clearly, a motion to dismiss could be considered 
by the court. To hold otherwise would require a waste of 
judicial resources in hearing meritless petitions. Moreover, 
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard on the motion 
to dismiss and was not denied any due process rights by the 
dismissal. (See transcript dated November 10, 1986.) 
POINT III 
THIS COURT BT ITS OWN RULES SHOULD 
BOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT WERE THE 
COURT TO DECIDE THAT IT HAS 
ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED. 
Utah R. Ct. App. 20(a) (1987) provides that petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus requiring evidentiary hearings will be 
transferred to the appropriate district court. Therefore, even 
if this Court were to determine that the petition was erroneously 
dismissed, it should remand the case for proceedings consistent 
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with that ruling to the Third District Court. There are no 
exigent circumstances requiring this Court to hear petitioner's 
complaint* 
POINT TV 
THB UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS 
OR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ARE RES 
JUDICATA ON THE ISSUE OF THE DENIAL 
OF TWO REQUESTS FOR DEFADLT 
JUDGMENT. 
On August 26, 1986 and September 29, 1986, the Utah 
Supreme Court denied petitioner's interlocutory appeals from the 
denials of his two motions for default judgment. £££. Addendum. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has already determined this issue against 
petitioner and this Court should not reconsider whether 
petitioner was entitled to default judgments. C«f« gtate v. 
Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985). 
Even if the Supreme Court's decisions were not res 
judicata, the requests for default judgment were properly denied. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(e) provides that no default judgment shall be 
entered against an officer of the State unless the claim is first 
established by evidence satisfactory to the court. In other 
words, an evidentiary hearing must be held before habeas corpus 
relief is granted; i.e., default judgment is inapplicable. 
This is a sound principal supported by federal case 
law. In Bermudez v. Reld, 733 F.2d 188 (2nd Cir. 1984), the 
court observed that the public would suffer by release of a 
person who was convicted and presumptively guilty if default 
actions were allowed in habeas corpus proceedings. The court 
held that before habeas corpus relief could be granted, a hearing 
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on the merits was required. On this basis, Judge Frederick 
properly denied the motions for a default judgment. 
CONCLUSIOH 
Respondent requests this Court to affirm the lower 
court's order dismissing the petition and to deny petitioner's 
reqfaest that this Court hear the petition on its merits. 
DATED th i s £>1A day of /htonvh , 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^XAss 
>^^4#Z 
DRA L . 
A sis tanf^tor i fey General 
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ADDENDUM 
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V. Mo. §60421 
Corald Cook: Wardon, Stato Prison* 
Defendant and tospondont. 
TNXS DAY, Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal It denied, 
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t fp SUPREME COUIT OF UTAH STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITV. UTAH 
• • p i . » i . I t t6 
OFFICE OF THE CLEtK 
RECEIVED 
16 ttT-3 * 4 3 3 
David L. m i kins on 
Stat* Attorney Central 
• U X L D X M C M A I L pGBWQ 
OCT 061985 
OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven V. Summers, 
Plaintiff and Appellant* 
a. 
Carald Cook: Warden. Stata Prison, 
Defendant and tespondent* 
Mo. •604S9 
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